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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KENNY JIM SHAW, ! 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. ; 
LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, : 
INC., a Utah corporation, : 
STEEL DECK ERECTORS, INC., : 
a Utah corporation, and : 
JOHN DOES A to Z, : 
Defendants/Appellees. 
LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, : 
INC., : 
Third-party Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
BILT-RITE CONCRETE, INC., a 
Nevada corporation; I. 
CHRISTENSEN INC., a Nevada : 
corporation or partnership; : 
HARV & HIGHAM MASONRY, : 
a Utah corporation; and TECH : 
STEEL, a Utah corporation, : 
Third-party Defendants. 
: CASE NUMBER: 930475-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution; Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(k), 1953 as amended; 
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and, Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as a 
matter of law, that Nevada Workers Compensation law applies to this 
case and that Defendants are exempt from common law liability for 
injuries suffered by the Plaintiff. 
2. Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as a 
matter of law, that Plaintiff is not entitled to bring this action 
for personal injuries pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended. 
3. Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as a 
matter of law, that Utah's Workers Compensation Act does not have 
extraterritorial effect and that Plaintiff is prohibited from 
bringing a personal injury claim against the named Defendants for 
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff. 
4. Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as a 
matter of law, that the choice of law doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti 
applies to workers' compensation cases where a Utah resident is 
injured while temporarily working in another state. 
5. Whether the law of a foreign state should be applied in 
workers' compensation cases where a Utah resident is injured while 
temporarily working in another state and brings a third party 
action in Utah. 
6. Whether the law of the state paying workers' compensation 
1 
benefits should be applied in cases where a resident of the State 
of Utah, receiving said benefits in Utah, brings a third party 
action in Utah. 
The standard of review for all issues of law presented on 
appeal herein is one of assessment for correctness. State v. Rio 
Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1342 (Utah, 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Plaintiff submits the following Constitutional and Statutory 
provisions which are determinative of the issues presented for 
appeal herein: 
1. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, Section 1: 
"All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
2. Utah Const, art. I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
3. Utah Const, art. I, Section 11: 
"All courts shall be open and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
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which he is a party, 
4. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended: 
See Addendum "A". 
5. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-54, 1953 as amended: 
See Addendum "B". 
6. Nevada Restatement Statutes, §616.270: See Addendum "C". 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Plaintiff/Appellant, Shaw, will sometimes be referred to 
as "Shaw"; and the Defendant/Appellee, Layton Construction Company, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, will sometimes be referred to as 
"Layton"; the Defendant/Appellee, Steel Deck Erectors, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, will sometimes be referred to as "Steel Deck". 
"R." refers to Record; and "Ex." refers to Exhibit. 
No record of the proceedings in the trial court was made or 
transcribed and therefore no reference will be made to the 
transcript of record. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A) Nature of the Case: 
This is an action brought pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended, arising from 
personal injuries sustained by Shaw while working on a construction 
project in the State of Nevada on February 5, 1990. The Plaintiff, 
his employer and the Appellees were, at all times relevant hereto, 
residents of the State of Utah and Shaw was hired in the State of 
Utah (R.3 7 7). Further, the subcontracts between Layton, Shawf s 
employer and the other Defendants were executed in Salt Lake City, 
Utah in 1989. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for 
personal injuries he received as a result of the negligence of the 
named Defendants (R. 2-7; 12-18). 
B) Course of Proceedings: 
This is an Appeal from final Orders of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Court Judge, dated November 
26, 1991 granting Layton's Motion to Dismiss and Steel Deck!s 
Motion for Summary Judgment which were docketed with the Clerk of 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or about 
the same said date, and from all Rulings and Orders of said Court 
affecting or pertaining to the rights claimed and asserted by the 
Plaintiff. (R. 321-325; 326-329). 
Defendants Layton and Steel Deck are the only Defendants who 
have been served and who have entered an appearance in this matter. 
Defendant, Bilt-Rite Concrete, Inc. (named in the Complaint as 
Built-Right Concrete, Inc.) is believed to be a Nevada corporation 
and has not been served in this matter. However, it has been 
served and entered an appearance as a third-party Defendant in the 
underlying third-party action brought by Layton against the 
subcontractors involved. (R. 39-76; 86-87A; 105-110). 
C) Disposition in Lower Court: 
Hearing on Layton's Motion to Dismiss and Steel Deck's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was held before the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, Third District Court Judge, on November 8, 1991. Prior to 
the hearing, Layton and Steel Deck submitted memoranda in support 
of their respective motions, Shaw submitted memoranda in 
opposition to each of the motions. The Court permitted oral 
argument and thereafter took the parties1 written and oral 
arguments under advisement. Thereafter, the Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision, containing its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and its Order dated November 26, 1991 granting both Motions 
and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 110-120A; 121-138; 139-
149; 165-174; 193-194; 195-237; 242-254; 256-272; 321-329). 
This case was previously on appeal before this Court pursuant 
to a Notice of Appeal which was filed on December 26, 1991 (R.345-
346). Inasmuch as this case also involves a third party Complaint 
by Layton against other third party Defendants, this Court, on its 
own Motion, dismissed that appeal on the grounds that this 
Plaintiff/Appellant did not obtain certification of the orders of 
dismissal as final judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Accordingly, said appeal (case number 920685-CA) 
was dismissed without prejudice. 
Pursuant to Motion and Stipulation, the parties hereto 
obtained a certification from the Trial Court as required by Rule 
54(b) dated July 8, 1993. A Notice of Appeal was filed by the 
Plaintiff with the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah on July 20, 1993. The matter is now 
before this Court for consideration of the issues raised by the 
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Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about February 5, 1990, the Plaintiff, Shaw, was injured 
while working on Phase II of the Maximum Security Prison in Ely, 
Nevada. Shaw, at all times relevant hereto, was and is a resident 
of the State of Utah and at the time of his injury was employed by 
Harv & Higham Masonry, a Utah corporation and one of the 
subcontractors on the project at the time of Shaw's injury (R.322-
323). Shaw was first employed by Harv & Higham in May, 1989 in 
Utah. (R. 2-7; 374) (See Kenny Shaw Deposition, page 17, line 18). 
At the time of his injury, Shaw had been in Ely, Nevada since about 
November, 1989. (R.377) (See Kenny Jim Shaw Deposition, page 20, 
lines 6-14). 
Layton is a Utah corporation and was the general contractor on 
the prison project. Steel Deck, also a Utah corporation, was one 
of the subcontractors on the project. All of the subcontracts 
relevant to this action were executed and entered into in Salt Lake 
City, Utah in or about July, 1989 (R. 44-56). 
Subsequent to his injury, Shaw applied for and received 
workers1 compensation benefits from the Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah and entered into a Compensation Agreement for his 
permanent/partial disability which was approved by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 
Shaw filed this action pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended, (Addendum "A") to 
recover damages from negligent third parties including the 
Defendants herein. (R.2-7; 12-18). 
Defendant, Layton, filed a Motion to Dismiss and Defendant, 
Steel Deck, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Both parties 
contended that Shaw's only remedy was that granted to him by 
Nevada's workers' compensation laws and that pursuant to those 
laws, he was barred from bringing any third party action. 
Defendants asserted the doctrine of lex loci delicti applies to 
workers' compensation cases where a Utah resident is injured while 
temporarily working in another state for a Utah employer and that 
he is prohibited from bringing a third party action in Utah. 
In opposition to the Defendants' Motions, Shaw asserted that 
the Utah Legislature intended to give extraterritorial effect to 
Utah's Workmens Compensation Act including Shaw's right to bring a 
third party action under Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 
as amended. Shaw contended that this right is especially 
applicable where the tortfeasors were Utah residents and where he 
was hired in Utah by a Utah employer and received workers' 
compensation benefits in Utah. 
On November 8, 1991, a hearing on Defendants' Motions was held 
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. After taking the 
parties' written and oral arguments under advisement, the trial 
court granted both motions, ruling as a matter of law that Nevada's 
workers' compensation laws apply to this case and that the 
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Defendants were immune and exempt from liability for Shaw's 
injuries. The trial court further ruled that Shaw was not entitled 
to bring this action under Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-62, 1953 as 
amended, and that Utah's Workmens Compensation Act has no 
extraterritorial effect. (R. 321-325; 326-329). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue before this Court is whether Utah's workers' 
compensation law should be applied in allowing Shaw to pursue a 
third party action against the Defendants for injuries he sustained 
while temporarily working in Nevada for his Utah employer. While 
Utah's Workmens Compensation Act allows such suits, Nevada's 
workers' compensation law does not (Addendum "C"). This is not a 
contract or tort law choice of law issue, but rather a workers' 
compensation choice of law matter which is different due to certain 
governmental interests and the public policy of this state. 
As it pertains to third party actions arising from within the 
workers' compensation context, Plaintiff contends that the workers' 
compensation laws of Utah should be applied in allowing such 
actions where certain factors are present. Namely, where the 
residence of the Plaintiff, his employer and the Defendants is in 
Utah; where Plaintiff was hired in Utah; and where the Plaintiff 
applied for and received workers' compensation benefits in Utah. 
It is clear and unmistakable that the Utah Legislature and 
this Court have stated that the public policy of this state is to 
provide for a right of action on behalf of an injured employee 
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against a third party tortfeasor. Further, this right should be 
extended to Utah residents who are hired in Utah by a Utah employer 
and who are injured while temporarily working in another state. 
This right is clearly established by the extraterritoriality of 
Utah's Workmens Compensation Act as enunciated by this Court and 
our Legislature. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH'S WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT GOVERNS RIGHT OF 
UTAH RESIDENT TO BRING THIRD PARTY ACTION FOR 
INJURIES SUSTAINED WHILE TEMPORARILY WORKING 
IN ANOTHER STATE WHERE UTAH RESIDENT WAS 
HIRED AND RECEIVED WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS IN UTAH 
The principal issue which is before this Court is essentially 
one involving a choice of laws. It is an issue which has not 
heretofore been settled by this Court and one which merits 
attention as it bears upon the substitive rights of this state's 
residents who are hired by a Utah employer and are injured on the 
job while temporarily in another state. Specifically, can a 
resident of this State who is hired here and required to 
temporarily work in another state, sue negligent third parties who 
cause injury to him? It is not an issue of which state's contract 
or tort law applies, but rather which state's workers' compensation 
law applies because an individual's right to bring a third party 
action exclusively derives from the applicable workers' 
compensation law, i.e., Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-62, 1953 as 
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amended. Plaintiff contends that the trial court was in complete 
error in ruling that the tort doctrine of lex loci delicti applies 
in workmens compensation cases such as this and that Nevada law, 
which bars such actions, applies. Furthermore, the legal 
authorities which the Defendants submitted to the trial court in 
support of their arguments didn't involve or address this specific 
issue. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the trial 
court's ruling dismissing this case. 
While this Court has not addressed this specific issue, the 
Plaintiff directs the Court's attention to numerous other 
jurisdictions, both state and federal, which clearly hold that the 
worker's compensation law of the state where the employee resides, 
where he was hired, and where he received workmens compensation 
benefits, determines his right to bring a third party action for 
injuries sustained in the course of employment while temporarily in 
another state. In Simaitis v. Flood, 437 A.2d 828 (Conn. 1980) an 
injured employee brought an action in Connecticut against a 
coemployee based upon the negligent operation of an automobile 
while they were in the state of Tennessee. Both the Plaintiff and 
Defendant were residents of Connecticut; they were hired in 
Connecticut, and their principal place of employment was in 
Connecticut. Each received workers' compensation benefits under 
Connecticut law for injuries sustained in Tennessee. Tennessee law 
did not allow an employee to sue a coemployee for injuries, and 
Connecticut's workers' compensation law did permit such suits. 
12. 
By way of comparison to the case at hand, Plaintiff points out 
that he and the Defendants are residents of Utah; Shaw was hired in 
Utah and his principal place of employment is in Utah (R. 374, 377) 
as are the Defendants1 principal places of business. Shaw applied 
for and received workers1 compensation benefits in Utah for the 
injuries he sustained in Nevada. Nevada law does not allow suits 
against negligent third parties. Utah allows such suits pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-62, 1953 as 
amended, and the cases of Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 777 P.2d 
428 (Utah, 1989), and Bosch v. Busch Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 
431 (Utah, 1989). 
In Simaitis, supra, the Connecticut Supreme Court was faced 
with the issue of which state's workers1 compensation law should be 
applied in determining whether a third party action would be 
allowed. It first addressed then rejected the contract choice of 
law rule. Id. at 831. Next, it discussed the tort choice of law 
rule requiring application of the law of the state where the injury 
occurred which is more commonly known as the rule of lex loci 
delicti being asserted by the Defendants in the present case. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the application of lex loci 
delicti in workers1 compensation cases stating that: 
"The place-of-the-injury rule affords only an 
unsatisfactory resolution to the workers' 
compensation choice of laws problem.ff Id. at 
831 (emphasis added) 
The Court continued: 
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The application of Connecticutfs tort choice 
of law principles to compensation cases would 
bestow upon temporary visitors injured in 
Connecticut all the relief which the 
Connecticut compensation act affords, but deny 
that same relief to Connecticut residents 
injured while on temporary business outside 
the state, even when all of the incidents of 
employment such as in this case, are in 
Connecticut. Moreover, if this court were to 
adhere to strict application of the place-of-
the-injury rule, a Connecticut resident and 
employee of a Connecticut employer under a 
Connecticut contract, who was injured while on 
temporary business in another jurisdiction 
might be left with no tort remedy whatsoever 
if that other jurisdiction applied a different 
choice of law rule. id. at 831 
The Court then went on to adopt and hold that there is a 
separate workers1 compensation Choice of Law standard which should 
be applied in this type of case. It held that: 
"Connecticut's interest in compensating the 
injured employee, a Connecticut resident to 
the fullest extent possible is clear and 
legitimate. Connecticut's other articulable 
interest lies in permitting the Plaintiff's 
employer, a Connecticut corporation, to 
recover from the Defendant the amount of 
compensation already paid or to be paid in the 
future..." Id. at 832. 
The Court then cited Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Company, 
448 U.S. 261, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 65 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980) and said: 
Just as Virginia had no legitimate interest in 
preventing the District of Columbia from 
awarding relief supplemental to that awarded 
in Virginia, Tennessee has no legitimate 
interest in preventing Connecticut from 
providing the injured employee with a right of 
action for damages against a third party, 
particularly where both the employee and the 
alleged tortfeasor are Connecticut residents, 
the employer is a Connecticut corporation and 
1! 
the employee was hired and principally 
employed in Connecticut. Simaitis, supra, at 
832. 
In its conclusion, the Court in Simaitis then held that 
"the applicable law in a workers' compensation 
case is the law of the place of the employment 
relation, because the existence of the 
employer-employee relation within the state 
gives the state an interest in controlling the 
incidents of that relation, one of which 
incidents is the right to receive and the 
obligation to pay compensation" Id. at 833. 
(emphasis added) 
Plaintiff here urges this Court to adopt the same Choice of 
Law standard in workers' compensation cases such as this for the 
same reasons enunciated by the Connecticut Supreme Court and the 
authorities cited hereafter. As in Simaitis, Utah clearly has an 
interest in compensating a Utah resident who is injured while 
temporarily working in another state, to the fullest extent 
possible. Likewise, Utah's interest also lies in permitting Shaw's 
employer, a Utah corporation and the workers' compensation carrier, 
to recover from the Defendants those amounts of compensation paid 
as is permitted under Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-62. 
The workers' compensation law of the State of Utah, which 
allows third party actions, should be applied because Shaw and his 
employer are Utah residents; Shaw was hired in Utah; Shaw received 
workers' compensation benefits in Utah; the Defendants are also 
Utah residents; Shaw's presence in Nevada was only temporary and 
was an incident of his employment (R. 322-323). To bar any 
recovery for Shaw against third parties would run contrary to the 
15 
holding of the United States Supreme Court in the Thomas case, 
cited supra in that Nevada has no legitimate interest in preventing 
Utah from providing Shaw with a right of action for damages against 
a third party, especially where the parties involved are Utah 
residents and Shaw was hired in Utah by a Utah corporation and Shaw 
is principally employed in Utah, 
Connecticut is not alone in holding that there is a distinct 
Choice of Law standard involving workers1 compensation cases which 
doesn't recognize the tort standard of lex loci delicti. 
In Braxton v. Anco Electric Co., 397 S.E.2d 640 (N.C.App. 
1990) the North Carolina Court of Appeals dealt with a case which 
is squarely on point with the one now before this Court. In 
Braxton, a North Carolina resident was employed by a plumbing 
subcontractor, a North Carolina corporation, to work on a shopping 
center in Virginia. The general contractor and the electrical 
subcontractor, Anco, named as defendant, were also North Carolina 
corporations. Braxton was injured in an electrical explosion. He 
applied for and received workers1 compensation benefits in North 
Carolina. He also filed a civil action in North Carolina against 
Anco alleging negligence of Anco's employees in causing his 
injuries. Anco sought and obtained a dismissal on the grounds that 
the action was barred by Virginia's Worker's Compensation Act which 
prohibits such actions. 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and 
held that even though the principle of lex loci applies in standard 
16 
tort cases, it does not apply in third party workers1 compensation 
cases due to certain governmental interests and public policy of 
North Carolina. The Court stated: "North Carolina is the place of 
Plaintiff's residence, the location of Defendant's business, and 
the place of initial hiring." Id. at 643. It held that North 
Carolina's workers' compensation law should be applied in 
permitting the third party suit because North Carolina's public 
policy is "to provide for a right of action on behalf of an injured 
employee against a third party tortfeasor (even if a fellow 
subcontractor) and even though the injured employee applied for and 
received workers' compensation benefits." id. at 643. 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-62, and this Court's decisions in 
Marathon Steel and Bosch clearly establish this state's public 
policy to provide the same relief to an injured Utah employee 
against a third party tortfeasor as does North Carolina and the 
other jurisdictions cited herein. 
In Hauch v. Connor, 453 A. 2d 1207 (Md. 1983) the Maryland 
Court of Appeals recognized and adopted the same Choice of Law 
standard set forth in Simaitis and Braxton. In discussing the rule 
of lex loci delicti, that Court said: "Here we are concerned not 
with differences between Maryland and Delaware tort law, but with 
differences in the workmen's compensation law of the two states.'' 
Id. at 1210 (emphasis added). The Court continued: 
Today, however, many courts recognize that 
workmen's compensation law conflict issues 
present distinct policy questions and should 
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not be treated as tort or contract matters for 
choice of law purposes. We agree with this 
approach. Id. at 1211 
The Maryland Court held that even though the injury in 
question didn't occur in Maryland, there were "greater Maryland 
issues" involved, and that Maryland workers1 compensation law 
should determine the threshold question of the right to bring suit 
in Maryland courts. Id. at 1214. 
In Saharceski v. Marcure, 366 N.E.2d 1245, (Mass. 1977), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court faced with the identical issue 
concluded that the workers1 compensation laws of the state of 
employment determines whether a third party tort action may be 
brought. In Saharceski, Massachusetts law barred third party suits 
and the Court held that a Massachusetts resident injured in 
Connecticut could not recover. The Court determined that the 
reasonable expectations of the parties was significant and that 
reference to the place of common employment provides both a certain 
source for resolution of the issue and the "assurance that the 
ability to maintain a tort action will not turn solely on the 
fortuitous circumstance of where the accident takes place." Id. at 
1249 (citing Wilson v. Faull, 141 A.2d 768 {NJ 1958}). 
In the present case, there is a clear conflict between 
Nevada's workers' compensation laws and Utah's. Nevada's law 
prohibits third party actions of this type while Utah's does not. 
As was argued to the trial court by this Plaintiff, this is not a 
common law tort action governed by the common law doctrine of lex 
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loci delicti. The cited authorities clearly agree. This cause of 
action is granted by statute and a different Choice of Laws issue 
arises. The State of Utah has a clear interest in overseeing and 
regulating the rights of its residents who are hired in Utah by a 
Utah employer and who are injured while temporarily outside of this 
state. 
To now prohibit Shaw and other Utah residents in the same 
position from pursuing this type of action based solely on the 
"fortuitous circumstance" of where the injury occurred is clearly 
against the policies established by our Legislature and this Court 
and is repugnant to the underlying goals of our workers1 
compensation statutes. Without any question, had the injury 
occurred in Utah, Shaw would be allowed to proceed against the 
Defendants involved herein. However, the Defendants and the trial 
court feel that because Shaw was in Nevada when the injury occurred 
he should now be barred from pursuing the remedies available to him 
from the state where he was hired and where he received his 
workers' compensation benefits. This clearly runs contrary to the 
reasonable expectations of Shaw and anyone in his position that he 
will be protected by the workmens compensation laws of this state 
should they be required to work temporarily in another state. 
In Quiles v. Heflin Steel Supply Company, 699 P.2d 1304 (Ariz. 
App. 1985), the Arizona Court of Appeals dealt with this same 
issue. In that case, a California resident, who was hired in 
California by a California employer, was injured in the course of 
• , • ' • 1 "I } 
b :3 employment w uile temporari . y 
u..*<- a leged ».•» ,<- caused by an i-:-...*>\ .-t- >f * in d ;>a:i.\. 
*—--J '••mi^-^^^ benefits ^ n 
Californic iwsuii wab ; ^ t-. n 
insurance carrier *;:3m~n i neal moi/ third part1, 4" recover 
. •• . ..* a law. . l m lc^~ • 
Code Annotated, s^b-i-o*.,, pi^vjue^ i^ the same cause 
the insurance carrier and/oi the t-MJ'ov.-i . 
general damages for negligence which permitted under •_ 
California statute and wtirh nkewise permitted under Utah 
worker s , compeui ieci d :i ng \ /h :i ch law 
should govern, l = :t; Arizona L u u n nen:. 
When compensation has been paid the law of the 
state of compensation should govern in third-
party actions including the nature and extent 
of lien subrogation, and assignment of rights. 
Id, at 1308. (emphasis added) 
•resent case, the lawsi-• v .-^ h wa? filed aoainsr r.r • 
Defendants u \c a,:,,. ;:• 
behalf •. Workers Compensatu .-<; -. o 
broual -^half •• ,-,-»- ^ I n r n t i f r 
Shaw, recording ,.,. <i • . .. . . . juiies, 
lawr, o: ul3H state of Utah shoulo goven :•? ^  i IT wing this type 
I -/;liitiff on behalf of himself 
and the workers1 compensate- -arrier since the w- ::)r kersl|" 
compensation benefits were paid here and not in Nevada. See also, 
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Miller v. Yellow Cab Co., 31 N.E.2d 406 (111. 1941). 
In Ouiles, the Court further held that "workers1 compensation 
rights are substantive not merely procedural and therefore, once 
the worker has exercised his choice of where to seek compensation 
the compensation scheme of that state shall apply." Supra. at 
1309, See also. Restatement Second Conflict of Laws, §§6, 145 and 
181-185 (1971). 
In this case, a claim was filed in Utah with the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah and Shaw received compensation benefits 
in Utah. At no time did any of the Defendants protest Shaw's 
receiving benefits here nor have they disputed his rights to 
receive such benefits here. According to the ruling in Ouiles, the 
"compensation scheme" of Utah should apply and that includes the 
provision allowing third party actions under Utah Code Annotated, 
§35-1-62. 
Time and time again, the standard set forth in this type of 
case is not the traditional lex loci delicti standard for a common 
law tort action. This is due to the fact that this type of case is 
not a traditional common law tort action. Although the claim is 
against third parties for negligence, it is different in that it is 
a claim which is created by statute based on certain public policy 
considerations enunciated by the Legislature and this Court. 
Second, this type of case is different in that the Plaintiff's 
presence in the other state is a direct result of an employment 
contract entered into in Utah and Plaintiff is required to go to 
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the other state as a condition of his employment. It is not a 
situation where someone who is just passing through or vacationing 
in another state is injured as a result of someone else's 
negligence. Such an occurrence has no connection to Utah's 
workers1 compensation laws and the policies contained therein. 
The prevailing rule clearly states that an employee, who is 
hired in one state, and who is injured in the course of his 
employment while temporarily working in another state is entitled 
to the benefits under the workers1 compensation law of the state 
where he is employed, including the right to bring a third party 
action if the workers' compensation laws of the state of employment 
so allows- Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1985), 
O'Connor v. Lee-Hv Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2nd Cir. 1978), 
certiorari denied, Gillespie v. Schwartz, 493 U.S. 1034, 99 S.Ct. 
638, 58 L.Ed.2d 696, Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578 F.Supp. 871 
(D.C.N.Y. 1983), Fox v. Sharlow, 579 A.2d 603 (Conn. Super. 1990), 
Fagan v. John J. Casale, Inc., 16 Misc.2d 1046, 184 N.Y.S.2d 109 
(1959). 
The Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt this rule and hold 
that the provisions of Utah's workers' compensation laws should be 
applied in allowing Shaw to maintain a third party action against 
negligent tortfeasors for injuries he sustained while temporarily 
working in the state of Nevada. It is obvious and clear that the 
State of Utah has a compelling and legitimate interest in applying 
its own workers compensation laws based on employment relationships 
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and contracts which are made within its boundaries by and between 
its residents. Although no constitutional issues were raised 
before the trial court, the denial of Shaw's right to bring and 
maintain this lawsuit may constitute a violation of the Equal 
Protection provisions of both the United States and Utah State 
Constitutions- For example, it would be manifestly unjust and 
discriminatory to allow one of Shaw's coemployees who is injured in 
Utah to have more remedies than someone like Shaw who has to go out 
of this state to work on a temporary basis. This would constitute 
unequal treatment of two Utah residents who work for the same Utah 
employer. Also, it is clear that one of the policy reasons for 
extending the protection of Utah's Workmens Compensation Act to 
someone in Shaw's position is to prevent the loss of protection to 
such an individual simply because his employer assigns him to go 
outside of this state on a temporary basis to work. Such an 
employee should not have to suffer merely because of the 
"fortuitous circumstance" of where he may be injured. 
POINT II 
UTAH'S WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT HAS EXTRATERRITORIAL 
EFFECT PERMITTING AN INJURED UTAH RESIDENT TO BRING 
A THIRD PARTY ACTION FOR INJURIES RECEIVED OUTSIDE 
OF THE STATE 
In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled, as a matter 
of law, that Utah's Workers Compensation Act does not have 
extraterritorial effect for injuries to a Utah worker injured in 
another state and that Shaw is prohibited from bringing a personal 
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injury claim against the Defendants herein (R. 321-325; 326-329). 
The ruling is incorrect and contrary to the prevailing statutory 
and case law. In United Air lines Transport Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 151 P.2d 591, 596, 107 Utah 52 (Utah 1944) the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed this issue recognizing that Utah's Workmens 
Compensation Act had extraterritorial effect. In deciding whether 
to exercise jurisdiction and apply Utah law where a Utah worker is 
injured outside of this state, the Court must first look at where 
the contract of employment was entered into and the residency of 
the parties to that contract. In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
172 P.2d 669, 675 (Utah 1946) the Utah Supreme Court dealt with a 
situation similar to that presented in this case. In deciding 
whether Utah's Workmens Compensation Act should apply where a Utah 
resident was injured in another state, the Court stated: 
The entering into a contract of employment 
within the state between residents and 
citizens thereof creates the relationship of 
employer and employee, although the same is 
not localized within this state, which is 
sufficient to give this state jurisdiction to 
regulate that relationship. This state is 
interested in providing this protection to its 
residents and citizens. (emphasis added) 
The underlying contract between Layton and Shaw's employer, 
Harv & Higham Masonry, was entered into in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
July 19, 1989. All of the parties involved, including Layton, Harv 
& Higham Masonry, and Shaw himself were and still are Utah 
residents. Consequently, the State of Utah has jurisdiction to 
regulate that relationship and apply its workers' compensation laws 
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even though the injury occurred in another state. As stated in the 
Allen case supra, the state of Utah has an interest in protecting 
its citizens when they are hired in this state by another Utah 
resident but injured in a foreign jurisdiction. In determining 
whether a workers1 compensation act should be applied 
extraterritorially, the general rule is to look at the intention of 
the legislature in the enactment of the statute. 
Generally speaking, whether or not the 
workmen's compensation act of the state where 
the contract of employment was made extends to 
injuries received outside the state depends 
upon the intention of the legislature, and 
such intention is to be ascertained in 
accordance with the general rules of statutory 
construction. There is very little difficulty 
in applying the act of the state of employment 
where the legislative intention so to apply it 
is made manifest by the provision of the act. 
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §23(a). 
In addition to the earlier cited cases which were decided by 
this Court declaring that Utah's Workmens Compensation Act had 
extraterritorial effect for injuries received by Utah residents 
while temporarily outside of the state, Plaintiff directs the 
Court's attention to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-
54 which clearly states the Legislature's intention that the Act is 
to be applied extraterritorially in situations such as the one now 
before this Court. §35-1-54 provides: 
If an employee who has been hired or is 
regularly employed in this state receives 
personal injury by accident arising out of and 
in the course of such employment outside of 
this state, he, or his dependents in case of 
his death, shall be entitled to compensation 
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according to the law of this state. This 
provision shall apply only to those injuries 
received by the employee within six months 
after leaving the state, unless prior to the 
expiration of such six months the employer has 
filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah 
notice that he has elected to extend such 
coverage a greater period of time. 
The Defendants argued in the trial court that the 
extraterritorial aspects of Utah's Workmens Compensation Act 
applied only to the right of the injured employee to receive 
"compensation" and not his right to bring a third party action 
under §35-1-62. Plaintiff submits that such an argument is 
erroneous and runs contrary to the intent of our Legislature to 
protect the interests and rights of residents of Utah who are 
injured while temporarily in another state. Further, based upon 
the authorities cited herein, Plaintiff contends that the 
Legislature intended that the entire Act be applied 
extraterritorially and not in a piecemeal fashion. This would 
include the provisions of §35-1-62 permitting third party actions 
against negligent tortfeasors. 
Furthermore, it is this Plaintiff's position that unless the 
Act specifically states otherwise, it is to have extraterritorial 
effect in its entirety. In State ex. rel. Lonev v. State 
Industrial Accident Board, 286 P 408 (Mont. 1930) the Montana 
Supreme Court held: 
The weight of authority in this country 
sustain the assertion that a Workmen's 
Compensation Act will apply to injuries to 
workmen employed in the state and injured 
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while temporarily out of its limits, unless 
there is something in the act making it 
inapplicable or clearly denying the right of 
the employee to recover in such case, id at 
409. 
In the context of the extraterritorial application of a 
workers1 compensation act in a third party tort action, the United 
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in discussing the Mississippi 
workers1 compensation statute said: 
Under certain conditions an employee, 
regularly employed in one state, who is 
injured in the course of his employment while 
temporarily employed in another state, shall 
be entitled to benefits under the workmen's 
compensation law of the state where he is 
regularly employed. 
Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1182 (5th Cir. 1985), 
rehearing denied 779 F.2d 682. 
Under this standard, it is clear that since Shaw was employed 
in the state of Utah, and more specifically was "regularly 
employed" in this state, he should be entitled to all of the 
benefits under Utah's Workmens Compensation Act which would include 
his right to bring a third party tort action against the Defendants 
herein. 
In the case of Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P. 2d 1363 (Wyo. 
1988), the Wyoming Supreme Court was faced with an issue almost 
identical to that now before this Court. In that case, a Wyoming* 
resident was killed while working for his Wyoming employer on a 
temporary basis in the State of Colorado. The employee's estate 
filed a lawsuit against the employer, the employer's corporate 
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grandparent and coemployees for wrongful death. The Wyoming 
Supreme Court held that Wyoming's workers1 compensation statute 
applied to a worker while he was temporarily working in Colorado 
and that the personal representative of the employee's estate was 
entitled to maintain a culpable negligence suit against coemployees 
although the injury occurred in Colorado. 
The statute then before the Wyoming Court was §27-12-208(a), 
W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement which provided: 
If an employee, while working outside of the 
territorial limits of this state, suffers an 
injury on account of which he, or in the event 
of his death, his dependents, would have been 
entitled to the benefits provided by this act 
{§§27-12-101 through 27-12-804} had the injury 
occurred within this state, the employee, or 
in the event of his death resulting from the 
injury, his dependents, are entitled to the 
benefits provided by this act, if at the time 
of the injury: 
(i) his employment is principally 
located in this state; 
(ii) he is working under a contract 
of hire made in this state in 
employment not principally localized 
in any state; or 
(iii) he is working under a contract 
of hire made in this state in 
employment principally localized in 
another state whose worker's 
compensation law is not applicable 
to his employer. 
This statutory provision, as noted by the Wyoming Court, is 
almost identical to the Model Worker's Compensation Act pertaining • 
to extraterritorial coverage for employees while working on a 
temporary basis in a state other than that where the employee was 
hired. Plaintiff points out that both the Wyoming statute and the 
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Model Worker's Compensation Act merely state the employee or his 
heirs are entitled to the benefits provided by the act. These 
statutes do not specifically state that the employee or his heirs 
have a right to bring a third party action for injuries received 
outside of the state. Nevertheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court in 
this case relied upon the extraterritorial language of this statute 
in holding that it extends to the right of the employee to bring 
such a third party action. Accordingly, any contention by the 
Defendants that the extraterritorial provisions of the Utah Act 
apply only to the employee's rights to receive "compensation" and 
nothing else is erroneous and without any legal basis whatsoever. 
The Defendants may contend that the terms "benefits" and 
"compensation" have different meanings and that Utah's statute 
should be more narrowly construed. Plaintiff directs the Court's 
attention to §35-1-44(6) which defines the term "compensation" as 
follows: "Compensation" shall mean the payments and benefits 
provided for in this title" (emphasis added). Just as in the 
Wyoming Act and the Model Worker's Compensation Act, the term 
"benefits" is used and it is apparent that this term can and should 
be construed to mean all of the benefits allowed under the Workmens 
Compensation Act including the right to bring a third party tort 
action for injuries received by the employee while temporarily 
outside of the state. 
Nowhere in the Utah Act does it state that it is not to have 
extraterritorial effect and as stated earlier, it is a generally 
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accepted and well established principle that unless a workers1 
compensation act expressly provides that it shall have no extra-
territorial effect, it applies to workmen employed in a state to do 
work outside of the territorial limits of that state. Gooding v. 
Ott, 87 S.E. 862 (W.Va.). The Utah Act contains no provision which 
states that it should have no extraterritorial effect. On the 
contrary, §35-1-54 clearly states that it is to have such an effect 
and that all of the benefits included in the entire act are to be 
extended to Utah residents who are hired within this state and who 
are injured while temporarily working outside of its boundaries. 
And, as already set forth above, this includes the right granted 
under §35-1-62 to sue negligent third parties who caused the 
injuries to the employee while he was temporarily working outside 
of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, the prevailing authority clearly states 
that in the context of workers1 compensation cases, and third party 
actions arising from injuries in a foreign jurisdiction, there is 
a choice of law standard which is separate and apart from the lex 
loci delicti standard used in common law tort cases which the 
Defendants are urging should be applied. For various and 
legitimate policy reasons, the workers' compensation law of the 
state where the Plaintiff resides, where he was employed, and where 
he received his workers1 compensation benefits applies in 
determining his right to bring a third party action, not the 
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workers1 compensation laws of the state where he was injured. Of 
further relevance and importance is the residence of the employer 
and the tortfeasors. Essentially, every factor in this case is 
directly associated with Utah and its workers' compensation laws. 
Consequently, the extraterritoriality of Utah's Workmens 
Compensation Act and the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-
62 of the Act allowing third party suits, should be applied to this 
case allowing this Plaintiff to proceed with his lawsuit against 
any and all negligent tortfeasors including the name Defendants 
herein. 
Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Orders of 
the trial court granting Summary Judgment and Dismissal be reversed 
and that this matter be remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
Resp^ctfullV Submitted, 
DRY R</WALL 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-1-62, 1953 AS AMENDED 
35-1-62 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58; 
L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 7G, § 3; 1973, 
ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3. 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-1-54, 1953 AS AMENDED 
35-1-54 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-54. Employee injured outside state — Entitled to com-
pensation — Limitation of time. 
If an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state 
receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such 
employment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in case of his death, 
shall be entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. This 
provision shall apply only to those injuries received by the employee within 
six months after leaving this state, unless prior to the expiration of such six 
months period the employer has filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah 
notice that he has elected to extend such coverage a greater period of time. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 65; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3126; R.S. 1933, 42-1-52; L. 1941, ch. 37, 
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-52. 
ANALYSIS 
Employees of foreign corporation. 
Foreign compensation laws. 
Injuries in interstate commerce. 
Operation and effect. 
Words and phrases defined. 
Cited. 
Employees of foreign corporation. 
Since relation of employer and employee ex-
isted between foreign transportation company 
and truck driver in this state at time of injury, 
Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to 
make award, and such power in nowise de-
pended upon reading into his contract of em-
ployment the law of Colorado where the con-
tract was made, for when employer sent his 
employee into Utah to work for it there, it sub-
jected itself to this chapter. Buckingham 
Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 
342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937). 
Employer or its insurance carrier are not re-
quired to make payments to injury benefit fund 
where airline stewardess, employed in Califor-
nia by employer with its principal offices in 
California, is killed in course of temporary em-
ployment in Utah leaving no surviving depen-
dents. United Air Lines Transp. Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 752 
(1946). 
Foreign compensation laws. 
In action by employee for personal injuries 
arising in state of Wyoming, defense that Wyo-
ming had adopted Workmen's Compensation 
Act, and that such act furnished adequate and 
exclusive remedy to employee to recover com-
pensation, was sustained. Bozo v. Central Coal 
& Coke Co., 54 Utah 289, 180 P. 432 (1919). 
Resident employee who was injured in 
course of employment in another state was en-
titled to compensation for such injuries, al-
though employer was insured under laws of 
other state. Pickering v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 
Utah 35, 201 P. 1029 (1921). 
In the absence of proof it will be presumed 
that the provisions of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of another state are the same as 
those of the forum. Shurtliff v. Oregon Short 
Line R.R., 66 Utah 161, 241 P. 1058 (1925). 
Injuries in interstate commerce. 
Industrial Commission had power to make 
award under this section for injury to trucker 
employed by foreign corporation under foreign 
contract notwithstanding that trucker was in 
interstate commerce when injured. Bucking-
ham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 
Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937). 
Operation and effect. 
If employer-employee relationship is main-
tained in this state, Industrial Commission has 
jurisdiction to make an award notwithstanding 
that original contract of employment was en-
tered into in foreign state and that injury oc-
curred in foreign state. Fay v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 114 P.2d 508 (1941). 
Commission had right to award compensa-
tion for death of salesman occurring in Idaho, 
under first sentence of this section, notwith-
standing that original contract of employment 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
NEVADA REVISED STATUTE, §616.270 
616.270 LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 616.270 
616.270. Employers to provide compensation; relief from liability. 
1. Every employer within the provisions of this chapter, and those 
employers who shall accept the terms of this chapter and be governed by its 
provisions, as in this chapter provided, shall provide and secure compensation 
according to the terms, conditions and provisions of this chapter for any and 
all personal injuries by accident sustained by an employee arising out of and 
in the course of the employment. 
2. Travel for which an employee receives wages shall, for the purposes of 
this chapter, be deemed in the course of employment. 
3. In such cases the employer shall be relieved from other liability for 
recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal injury, unless by 
the terms of this chapter otherwise provided. (1947, p. 572; CL 1929 (1949 
Supp.), § 2680.26; 1971, p. 2058.) 
CASE NOTES 
I. General Consideration. 
II. Injury Arising Out of and In Course of Employment. 
III. Exclusivity of Act. 
IV. Provision of Coverage by Employer. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. 
Cited in: Simon Serv. Inc. v. Mitchell, 73 
Nev. 9. 307 P.2d 110 (1957); Tab Constr. Co. v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 83 Nev. 364. 432 
P.2d 90 (1967); Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 
87 Nev. 201, 484 P 2d 572 (1971); Nevada 
Indus. Comm'n v. Reese, 93 Nev. 115, 560 P.2d 
1352 (1977); Spencer v. Harrah's Inc., 98 Nev. 
99, 641 P.2d 481 (1982); Lewis v. United 
States, 680 F 2d 68 (9th Cir. 1982). 
II. INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN 
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. 
Negligence of fellow employee. — When 
an employee is injured on the job as a result of 
the negligence of a fellow employee, his rem-
edy is compensation under the Nevada Indus-
trial Insurance Act. Leslie v. J.A. Tiberti 
Constr. Co., 99 Nev. 494, 664 P.2d 963 (1983). 
Assault while at work. — Where an em-
ployee is assaulted and injury is inflicted upon 
him through animosity and ill will arising 
from some cause wholly disconnected with the 
employer's business or the employment, the 
employee cannot recover compensation simply 
because he is assaulted when he is in the 
discharge of his duties. Under such circum-
stances, the injury does not arise out of the 
course of employment, and the employment is 
not the cause of the injury, although it may be 
the occasion of the willful act and may furnish 
the opportunity for its execution. McColl v. 
Scherer, 73 Nev. 226, 315 P.2d 807 11957). 
Assault by insane coemployee. — Em-
ployee's death, as a matter of law, arose out of 
the employment, where he was assaulted in 
the course of his employment by an insane 
fellow employee. Cummings v. United Resort 
Hotels, Inc., 85 Nev. 23, 449 P.2d 245 (1969). 
Shooting of employee. — In a personal 
injury action brought against a club owner by 
a waitress who was shot by a customer while 
on duty, summary judgment for the employer 
on grounds that she was covered by the Indus-
trial Insurance Act was improper, where there 
was no determination as to whether her injury 
resulted from being placed in a position of 
danger by reason of her employment or was the 
result of enmity, grudge, or other personal 
relationship. McColl v. Scherer, 73 Nev. 226, 
315 P.2d 807 (1957). 
Recreational activity. — Recreational ac-
tivity should not be deemed to be within the 
course of employment unless it is a regular 
incident of employment, or is required by the 
employer, or is of direct benefit to the employer 
beyond the intangible value of employee 
health and morale common to all kinds of 
recreation and social life; thus, where it was 
not a regular incident of employee's employ-
ment to enjoy recreation on his day off at golf 
driving range, and his employer did not re-
quire his presence there, nor did the employer 
receive a direct benefit from that off-duty 
activity beyond the intangible value of em-
ployee health and morale common to all kinds 
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